Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the knowledge of the RSA public and secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well known that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input (N , e, d) outputs the factors p and q. We present the first deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that factors N given (e, d) provided that e, d < ϕ(N ). Our approach is an application of Coppersmith's technique for finding small roots of univariate modular polynomials.
Introduction
The most basic security requirement for a public key cryptosystem is that it should be hard to recover the secret key from the public key. To establish this property, one usually identifies a well-known hard problem P and shows that recovering the secret key from the public key is polynomial-time equivalent to solving P.
In this paper we consider the RSA cryptosystem [11] . We denote by N = pq the modulus, product of two primes p and q of the same bit-size. Furthermore, we denote by e, d the public and private exponents, such that e · d = 1 mod ϕ(N ), where ϕ(N ) = ( p − 1) · (q − 1) is Euler's totient function. The public key is then (N , e) and the secret key is (N , d) .
It is well known that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time equivalence between computing d and factoring N . The proof is given in the original RSA paper by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [11] and is based on a work by Miller [8] .
In this paper we show that the equivalence can actually be made deterministic, namely we present the first deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input (N , e, d) outputs the factors p and q, provided that e · d ≤ N 2 . Since, for standard RSA, the exponents e and d are defined modulo ϕ(N ), we have that ed < ϕ(N ) 2 < N 2 as required. Our result is mainly of theoretical interest, since our deterministic algorithm is much less efficient than the probabilistic one. However, we also present an algorithm that recovers the factors p and q deterministically in time O(log 2 N ) when e · d ≤ N 3/2 ; this happens when e is small and d < ϕ(N ), which is common in practice.
Our technique is a variant of Coppersmith's theorem for finding small roots of univariate polynomial equations [2] . Coppersmith's theorem is based on the LLL lattice reduction algorithm [6] , and has found numerous applications in cryptanalysis (see [10] for a survey). We use a variant in which one considers polynomials modulo an unknown integer (instead of the known modulus). This variant was introduced by Boneh et al. in [1] for factoring moduli of the form p r q in polynomial time for large r . This approach was also used by Howgrave-Graham in [5] to compute approximate integer common divisors. Our technique is actually a direct application of Howgrave-Graham's algorithm, but for completeness we also provide a full description of our algorithm.
This article is an extended version of a paper published by May [7] at Crypto 2004. The difference with [7] is that our analysis is based on univariate modular polynomials instead of bivariate integer polynomials, which leads to a simpler algorithm. Moreover, we generalize our analysis to the case of unbalanced prime factors p and q. Quite expectedly, we obtain that the upper bound on ed gets larger when the prime factors are more imbalanced. For example, if p < N 1/4 , then the modulus N can be factored in polynomial time given (e, d) for e · d ≤ N 8/3 (instead of N 2 for prime factors of equal size).
Background on Lattices
Let u 1 , . . . , u ω ∈ Z n be linearly independent vectors with ω ≤ n. The lattice L spanned by u 1 , . . . , u ω consists of all integral linear combinations of u 1 , . . . , u ω , that is,
Such a set {u 1 , . . . , u ω } of vectors is called a lattice basis. All the bases have the same number of elements, called the dimension or rank of the lattice. We say that the lattice is full rank if ω = n. Any two bases of the same lattice can be transformed into each other by a multiplication with some integral matrix of determinant ±1. Therefore, all the bases have the same Gramian determinant det 1≤i, j≤d u i , u j . One defines the determinant of the lattice as the square root of the Gramian determinant. If the lattice is full rank, then the determinant of L is equal to the absolute value of the determinant of the ω × ω matrix whose rows are the basis vectors u 1 , . . . , u ω .
The LLL algorithm [6] computes a short vector in a lattice: 
In order to improve the complexity of our algorithm, we use an improved version of LLL, called the L 2 algorithm and due to Nguyen and Stehlé [9] . The L 2 algorithm achieves the same bound on b 1 but in time O(ω 4 n(ω + log B) log B).
An Algorithm for ed
In this section we consider the standard RSA setting, i.e. we assume that N is the product of two different prime factors p, q of the same bit-size. We also assume that ed ≤ N 3/2 . This is a practical case since for RSA one generally uses a small public exponent e (for example, e = 3 or e = 2 16 + 1). The following theorem shows that the factorization of N can then be recovered in deterministic time O(log 2 N ): Proof. In the following we assume without loss of generality that p < q, which implies
This gives the following useful estimates:
We denote by k the smallest integer greater than or equal to k. Furthermore, we denote by Z * ϕ(N ) the group of invertible integers modulo ϕ(N ). Since ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ), we know that
We show that k can be recovered up to a small constant when ed ≤ N 3/2 . Namely, we definek = (ed − 1)/N as an underestimate of k and we observe that
Using (1) we conclude that
Then since ed ≤ N 3/2 , we obtain that 0 < k −k < 6. Thus, one of the six values k +i, i = 0, 1, . . . , 5, must be equal to k. We can test these six candidates successively and for the right choice k, we can compute
from which one recovers the factorization of N . Our approach uses only elementary arithmetic on integers of bit-size O(log(N )). Thus, the running time is O(log 2 N ), which concludes the proof of the theorem.
The Case of ed
As in the previous section, we assume that N is the product of two primes p and q of same bit-size, but here we only assume that ed ≤ N 2 . Under this assumption, we show the deterministic polynomial-time equivalence between recovering d and factoring N . We will generalize to an N = pq with unbalanced prime factors in the next section.
Theorem 3. Let N = p · q, where p and q are two prime integers of the same bit-size. Let e, d be such that e
· d = 1 mod ϕ(N ). Then if 1 < e · d ≤ N 2 ,
there is a deterministic algorithm that given (N , e, d) recovers the factorization of N in time O(log 9 N ).
Proof. Our technique is a direct application of Howgrave-Graham's algorithm for approximate integer common divisors [5] . Given two integers a < b and M = b α for some α ∈ [0, 1], Howgrave-Graham's algorithm outputs all integers d > M dividing both a + x 0 and b for some |x 0 | < X , in time polynomial in log b, where X = b β and β = α 2 . Letting U = e · d − 1 and s = p + q − 1, our goal is to recover s from N and U . Then from s it is straightforward to recover the factorization of N . From U = 0 mod ϕ(N ) and ϕ(N ) = ( p − 1)(q − 1) = N − s, we observe that N − s divides both U and N − s. Therefore, one can apply Howgrave-Graham's algorithm with a := N , b := U , x 0 := −s and M = N /2. We have that α 1 2 and β 1 4 , which enables to recover s and eventually the factorization of N .
In the following, for completeness, we provide the full description of an algorithm for factoring N given (e, d), similar to Howgrave-Graham's algorithm. First, we assume that we are given the high-order bits s 0 of s. More precisely, we let X be some integer, and write s = s 0 · X + x 0 , where 0 ≤ x 0 < X . The integer s 0 will eventually be recovered by exhaustive search. Moreover, we denote ϕ = ϕ(N ).
we obtain the following equations:
We consider the polynomials
for 0 ≤ j ≤ m and i = 0, and for j = m and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where m, k are fixed parameters.
From (3) and (4), we have that for all previous (i, j),
For any linear integer combination h(x) of the polynomials g i j (x), we have that h(x 0 ) = 0modϕ m . Our goal is then to find a non-zero h(x) with small coefficients. Namely, using the following lemma from [4] , if the coefficients of h(x) are sufficiently small, we have that h(x 0 ) = 0 holds over the integers. The integer x 0 can then be recovered using any standard root-finding algorithm; eventually from x 0 one recovers the factorization of N . Given a polynomial h(x) = h i x i , we denote by h(x) the Euclidean norm of the vector of its coefficients h i .
Lemma 4 (Howgrave-Graham). Let h(x) ∈ Z[x] be the sum of at most ω monomials. Suppose that h(x
Proof. We have
We consider the lattice L spanned by the coefficient vectors of the polynomials g i j (x X). One can see that these coefficient vectors form a triangular basis of a fullrank lattice of dimension ω = m + k + 1 (for an example, see Fig. 1 ). The determinant of the lattice is then the product of the diagonal entries, which gives
The lattice L of the polynomials g i j (x X) for k = m = 3. The symbol " * " correspond to non-zero entries whose value is ignored.
Using LLL (Theorem 1), one obtains a non-zero vector b whose norm is guaranteed to satisfy
The vector b is the coefficient vector of some polynomial h(x X) with h(x X) = b . The polynomial h(x) is then an integer linear combination of the polynomials g i j (x), which implies that h(x 0 ) = 0 mod ϕ m . In order to apply Lemma 4, it is therefore sufficient to have that
Using the inequalities
we obtain the following sufficient condition:
From (5) and inequality U < N 2 , this gives
which gives the following condition for X :
.
Our goal is to maximize the bound X on x 0 , so that fewer bits must be exhaustively searched. For a fixed m, the function γ (m, k) is maximal for k = m. The corresponding bound for k = m is then
The LLL algorithm is therefore applied on a lattice of dimension ω = m + k + 1 = 2 · m + 1 and with entries bounded by B = O(N 2m ). Since the running time of LLL is polynomial in the lattice dimension and in the size of the entries, given s 0 such that s = s 0 · X + x 0 with 0 ≤ x 0 < X , the previous algorithm recovers the factorization of N in time polynomial in (log N , m) .
Finally, taking the greatest integer X satisfying (6), and using s = p + q − 1 ≤ 3N 1/2 , we obtain
Then, taking m = log N , we obtain that s 0 is upper-bounded by a constant. The previous algorithm is then run for each possible value of s 0 , and the correct s 0 enables us to recover the factorization of N . The running time is dominated by the time it takes to run LLL on a lattice of dimension ω = 2m + 1 with entries bounded by B = O(N 2m ). Since the running time of LLL is bounded by O(ω 6 log 3 B), our algorithm recovers the factorization of N in time O(log 12 N ). If one uses the L 2 variant instead of LLL, one obtains a running time of O(log 9 N ).
Generalization to Unbalanced Prime Factors
The previous algorithm fails when the prime factors p and q are unbalanced, because in this case we have that s = p + q − 1 √ N , and s is then much greater than the bound on X given by inequality (6) .
In this section we provide an algorithm which extends the result of the previous section to unbalanced prime factors. We use a technique introduced by Durfee and Nguyen in [3] , which consists in using two separate variables x and y for the primes p and q, and replacing each occurrence of x · y by N . We note that Howgrave-Graham's algorithm for finding approximate integer common divisors does not seem to apply in this case.
The following theorem shows that the factorization of N given (e, d) becomes easier when the prime factors are imbalanced. Namely, the condition on the product e · d becomes weaker. For example, we obtain that for p < N 1/4 , the modulus N can be factored in polynomial time given Proof. Let U = ed − 1 as previously. Our goal is to recover p, q from N and U . We have the following equations:
Let m ≥ 1, a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 0 be integers. We define the following polynomials g i jk (x, y):
In the definition of the polynomials g i jk (x, y), we replace each occurrence of x · y by N ; therefore, the polynomials g i jk (x, y) contain only monomials that are powers of x or powers of y. From (7) and (8), we obtain that ( p, q) is a root of g i jk (x, y) modulo ϕ m , for all previous (i, j, k):
Now, we assume that we are given the high-order bits p 0 of p and the high-order bits q 0 of q. More precisely, for some integers X and Y , we write p = p 0 · X + x 0 and q = q 0 · Y + y 0 , with 0 ≤ x 0 < X and 0 ≤ y 0 < Y . The integers p 0 and q 0 will eventually be recovered by exhaustive search. We define the translated polynomials:
It is easy to see that for all (i, j, k), we have that (x 0 , y 0 ) is a root of t i jk (x, y) modulo ϕ m :
As in the previous algorithm, our goal is to find a non-zero integer linear combination h(x, y) of the polynomials t i jk (x, y), with small coefficients. Then h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 mod ϕ m , and, using again Howgrave-Graham's lemma, if the coefficients of h(x, y) are sufficiently small, then h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 over the integers. Then one can define the polynomial
is not identically zero and h(x, y) contains only x powers and y powers, the polynomial h (x) cannot be identically zero. Moreover, h (x 0 ) = 0, which enables us to recover x 0 using any standard root-finding algorithm, and eventually the primes p and q. Given a polynomial h(x, y) = h i j x i y j , we denote by h(x, y) the Euclidean norm of the vector of its coefficients h i j .
Lemma 6 (Howgrave-Graham). Let h(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] which is the sum of at most ω monomials. Suppose that h(x
We consider the lattice L spanned by the coefficient vectors of the polynomials t i jk (x X, yY ). One can see that these coefficient vectors form a triangular basis of a full-rank lattice of dimension ω = 2m + a + b + 1 (for an example, see Fig. 2 ). The determinant of the lattice is then the product of the diagonal entries, which gives
As previously, using lattice reduction, one obtains a non-zero polynomial h(x, y) such that
In order to apply Lemma 6, it is therefore sufficient to have that
As in the previous section, using and Y = N δ y for some reals δ x , δ y . From (9) and U ≤ N β we obtain that
where log denotes the logarithm in base 2. Moreover, using m(u+v)−3 < ω ≤ m(u+v), we have
Therefore, combining inequalities (10), (11) and (12), we obtain the following sufficient condition:
The function u → u − δ x · u 2 /2 is maximal for u = 1/δ x , with a maximum equal to 1/(2δ x ). The same holds for the function v → v − δ y · v 2 /2. Therefore, taking u = 1/δ x and v = 1/δ y , we obtain the sufficient condition
For X = N δ x and Y = N δ y satisfying the previous condition and given p 0 and q 0 such that p = p 0 · X + x 0 and q = q 0 · Y + y 0 , the algorithm recovers x 0 , y 0 and then p, q in time polynomial in (m, log N ). In the following we show that p 0 and q 0 can actually be recovered by exhaustive search, while remaining polynomial time in log N .
Let ε be such that 0 < ε ≤ δ/2. We have the following inequalities:
Combining the three previous inequalities, we get
Therefore, taking δ x = δ − ε and δ y = 1 − δ − ε, we obtain from (13) the following sufficient condition:
Moreover, since 0 < ε ≤ δ/2 and δ < 1 2 , we have
Therefore, this gives the following sufficient condition:
Taking m = log N , this condition can always be satisfied for large enough log N . Taking the corresponding lower bound for ε, we obtain ε = O(1/log N ), which gives N ε ≤ C for some constant C. Therefore, we obtain that p 0 and q 0 are upper-bounded by the constants C and 2C:
This shows that p 0 and q 0 can be recovered by exhaustive search while remaining polynomial time in log N . The total running time of our algorithm is then dominated by running the lattice reduction algorithm on a lattice basis of dimension ω = O(m) and entries bounded by B = N O(m) . Therefore, using LLL, our algorithm recovers the factorization of N in time O(log 12 N ). If one uses the L 2 variant instead of LLL, one obtains a running time of O(log 9 N ).
Practical Experiments
We have implemented the two algorithms of Sections 4 and 5, using the LLL implementation of Shoup's NTL library [12] . First, we describe in Table 1 the experiments with prime factors of equal bit-size, with e · d N 2 . We assume that we are given the high-order bits of s = p + q; the observed running time for a single execution of LLL is denoted by t. The total running time for factoring N is then estimated as T 2 · t. We obtain that the factorization of N given (e, d) would take a few days for a 512-bit modulus, and a few years for a 1024-bit modulus. This contrasts with Miller's algorithm whose running time is only a fraction of a second for a 1024-bit modulus.
The experiments with prime factors of unbalanced size and with e · d N 2 are summarized in Table 2 . In this case it was not necessary to know the high-order bits of s = p + q, and one recovers the factorization of N after a single application of LLL. The results in Table 2 confirm that the factorization of N is easier when the prime factors are unbalanced.
Conclusion
We have shown the first deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that factors an RSA modulus N given the pair of public and secret exponents e and d, provided that e·d < N 2 . The algorithm is a variant of Coppersmith's technique for finding small roots of univariate modular polynomial equations. We have also provided a generalization to the case of unbalanced prime factors. Finally, we note that the problem of the deterministic polynomial-time equivalence between finding d and factoring N is not entirely solved in this paper, because finding an algorithm for e · d > N 2 remains an open problem. 
